Why Aren’t Young People Getting Married Anymore? (2) Women’s Empowerment and the Rise in Non-Marriage（Automatic Translation）

Some people argue, “Because women started working, fertility declined,” or “If we stop promoting women’s participation in the workforce and increase the number of full-time housewives, the falling birthrate problem will be solved.”

On the other hand, there are also reports suggesting that “countries where women’s participation in society has advanced tend to have higher total fertility rates.”

The statement in the first paragraph was introduced by Masahiro Yamada, the former president of the Japan Association for Family Sociology, in the association’s newsletter issued last November. According to him, this was “seriously proposed” by an advisor on birthrate countermeasures for a certain political party.

The second statement appears in a Cabinet Office report comparing fertility rates and female labor force participation across advanced economies (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau, 2005, p. 4). Because it comes from the Cabinet Office, some readers may assume this is the “correct” view. [1] At the very least, these remarks and texts make it clear that in Japan, “women working” and “women’s participation in society” are often discussed as factors related to declining fertility and rising non-marriage.

So, did fertility decline because women work? Or, conversely, will fertility recover if women participate more fully in society? In this second installment of the series “Why Don’t Young People Get Married These Days?”, I would like to briefly summarize and organize what family sociology and demography have said to date about the relationship between women’s social advancement and the rise in non-marriage . (The first article in the series is available here.)

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[1] For pitfalls in interpreting these data, see Akagawa (2004).

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• Women’s Economic Independence
• How Does Women’s Economic Independence Relate to Non-Marriage?
• Pathways Other Than the “Women’s Independence Hypothesis”
• The Limited Impact of Women’s Higher Education on Non-Marriage
• Conclusion

Women’s Economic Independence

Up through the middle of Japan’s high-growth era, university attendance was not especially common. From the 1970s onward, however, higher education expanded, and the pace of expansion was particularly rapid among women. The female university enrollment rate was 6.5% in 1970, rising to 12.3% in 1980, 31.5% in 2000, and 45.2% in 2010 (for comparison, the figures for men were 27.3% in 1970, 39.3% in 1980, and 56.4% in 2010) (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, "Population Statistics Materials 2025").

Alongside this trend, it has increasingly become taken for granted that women, like men, work for pay. There was a time when women who worked intensely and pursued careers “like men” were singled out as “career women.” Today, however, a life course in which women work and earn wages on a par with men has become widespread, and women’s career choices have also become more diverse than in the past. (Of course, it goes without saying that society is still far from a place where men and women can work under truly equal conditions, given persistent gender wage gaps and other disparities.)

In this sense, we can say that women’s economic independence has advanced. Due to women’s higher educational attainment, increased motivation to work, and expanded employment opportunities, Japanese society has moved toward a situation in which women can remain economically self-sufficient even without marrying.

How Does Women’s Economic Independence Relate to Non-Marriage?

One hypothesis claims that this growing independence among women has driven the rise in non-marriage. This is known as the “women’s independence hypothesis.” The idea is that as women become economically independent, marriage becomes less beneficial and less attractive, leading more women to choose not to marry and thereby increasing the share of those who remain unmarried. For a time, this hypothesis was widely accepted as a powerful explanation for rising non-marriage (it is also referred to as the “opportunity cost hypothesis” or the “work–family incompatibility hypothesis”).

In societies where gendered division of labor remains strong, balancing paid work with housework and childrearing is difficult. As a result, marriage often comes with the expectation that women will leave the workforce. Even if women return to work after finishing childrearing, Japan’s labor market—characterized (and in many respects still characterized) by mass hiring of new graduates, lifetime employment, and seniority-based wages—has often channeled women into part-time reemployment. Economically speaking, if women choose marriage, childbirth, and childrearing and retire from work, they lose the wages they would have earned had they continued working. Taking these foregone wages and benefits (i.e., opportunity costs) into account, some women choose not to marry. According to the women’s independence hypothesis, an increase in such choices leads to rising non-marriage. Under this framework, the more women’s educational attainment and labor force participation advance, the more non-marriage rises.

Since this hypothesis was proposed by the economist Gary Becker, many empirical studies based on this framework have been conducted in Japan as well. Noriko Tsuya, using microdata from the 2004 Japanese General Social Surveys–based international comparative survey on marriage and family (JGSS), showed that women with university degrees or higher have lower first-marriage rates than women with only high school education, and predicted that as higher education expands, later marriage and non-marriage among women would further increase (Tsuya, 2006). Tsuya also analyzed panel data combining follow-up results from the 2007 survey and demonstrated a negative relationship between women’s educational attainment and timing of first marriage, suggesting that higher education is one factor contributing to women’s non-marriage (Tsuya, 2009; 2011).

The women’s independence hypothesis is said to apply primarily in societies where the norm of gendered division of labor is strong—namely, where men are expected to work outside the home while women are expected to handle housework and childcare. Indeed, a study comparing Sweden (where such norms are weak), Japan (where they are strong), and the United States (intermediate) found that only in Japan do women’s higher education and higher income hinder the formation of first marriages. In the United States and Sweden, by contrast, women’s higher education and higher income actually promote first marriage (Ono, 2003). Building on such findings, some argue that fertility policy should move away from forcing women to choose between work and marriage/childbearing, and instead focus on removing barriers to combining work and family life (Tsuya, 2011).

From the perspective of the women’s independence hypothesis, in societies where gendered division-of-labor norms are strong, rising non-marriage can be seen as “a natural response by women seeking to avoid economic exploitation within the institution of marriage” (Ohashi, 2000, p. 33). In the 1990s, this hypothesis was widely supported in Japan as an explanation for non-marriage (e.g., Yashiro, 1993; Ohashi, 1993).

Pathways Other Than the “Women’s Independence Hypothesis”

In fact, today the women’s independence hypothesis is not as widely supported as it once was. Why?

First, we do not observe a dramatic decline in unmarried people’s desire to marry. Looking at the unmarried persons survey in the National Fertility Survey conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, at least up to 2015 there is no evidence of a sharp fall in marriage intentions. The women’s independence hypothesis assumes that women intentionally refrain from marriage (i.e., a deliberate choice of non-marriage) and that this leads to increased unmarriedness. If strong “anti-marriage” attitudes are not evident, then women’s social advancement is not an adequate explanation for rising non-marriage through that route.

Second, another pathway has gained attention: a widening gap between marriage aspirations and marriage reality, such that women increasingly cannot meet partners (men) who match their preferences.

In Japan, during the high-growth period, the trend toward women becoming full-time housewives expanded, and a gendered division of labor became entrenched. At the same time, a pattern of women’s hypergamy became established as a marriage norm. Hypergamy refers to the preference to marry someone with higher social status (education, income, and so on) than oneself. In societies where a male-breadwinner family model is widespread, it is arguably natural for women to seek partners with higher earning capacity than their own.

This hypergamy norm is said to have contributed to rising non-marriage through two changes: (1) deterioration in employment prospects for young men, and (2) women’s rising educational attainment and increased labor force participation.

Yamada (2007) points to the slowing growth of men’s real annual income after the 1973 oil shock, arguing that young men’s incomes fell relative to their fathers’ generation and that expectations of future income growth weakened. As young men’s employment prospects deteriorated, the gap widened between (a) unmarried men’s actual annual income (reality) and (b) the income unmarried women hope potential husbands will have (aspiration), thereby driving non-marriage.

Empirically, Kato (2004), analyzing data from the First National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ98), shows that changes in economic growth rates have substantive effects on men’s marriage timing through occupational strata. Kato concludes that when economic growth slows and non-marriage rises among relatively lower-status men, this in turn contributes to later marriage and non-marriage among women. These studies share the feature of emphasizing male-side factors—namely, (1) the deterioration of young men’s employment and earnings prospects—as drivers of non-marriage.

At the same time, it has also been shown that female-side factors—(2) women’s higher education and increased labor force participation—contribute to non-marriage. James Raymo and Miho Iwasawa demonstrated that among highly educated women, there is a shortage in the supply of suitable marriage partners (men) (Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005). This resembles the women’s independence hypothesis in that it links women’s higher education to non-marriage. However, unlike the independence hypothesis—which assumes women’s higher education reduces demand for marriage—this approach focuses on the supply side: women’s higher education makes it harder to find a male partner who “matches” their status.

Using data from the National Fertility Survey, Raymo and Iwasawa decomposed and analyzed the causes of the decline in first-marriage rates from 1980 to 1995. They found that as women’s educational attainment rose while hypergamy norms remained strong, the supply of marriage partners meeting highly educated women’s preferences fell short. This mismatch can explain a substantial share of non-marriage among highly educated women. This is called the “marriage market mismatch hypothesis.” In other words, even if highly educated women have higher non-marriage rates, it is not necessarily because they chose non-marriage; it may also reflect a shortage of matching partners.

It is often said that it is difficult to determine from existing data whether male-side factors (1) or female-side factors (2) play a larger role (Tsutsui, 2013). Still, whether driven by male-side factors, female-side factors, or a combination, this line of argument broadly shares the view that a mismatch has emerged in the marriage market. In that broad sense, it is sometimes referred to simply as the “mismatch hypothesis,” and it has become a fairly established interpretation of rising non-marriage in Japan.

The Limited Impact of Women’s Higher Education on Non-Marriage

As we have seen, research on both the women’s independence hypothesis and the marriage market mismatch hypothesis (especially studies focusing on female-side factors) suggests that women’s rising earning capacity—driven by higher education and workforce participation—can make marriage more difficult. This occurs because gendered division-of-labor norms remain strong; in countries where such norms are weaker, women’s improved earning capacity does not make marriage harder. Indeed, findings show that women with higher earning capacity may actually be more likely to marry in such contexts (Ono, 2003).

That said, even in Japan—particularly among younger people—the share of those who support a strict gendered division of labor has gradually declined compared with the past (Cabinet Office, Public Opinion Survey on a Gender-Equal Society). Against this backdrop, some studies have begun to identify new trends in the relationship between women’s earning capacity and marriage.

For example, Setsuya Fukuda, using panel data from the “Longitudinal Survey of Adults in the 21st Century,” finds that variables indicating women’s higher earning capacity—such as higher education, professional occupations, and higher income—have a positive effect on the likelihood of marriage, especially for marriage after age 26. Similarly, Akihiko Kato’s analysis of NFRJ98 data suggests that among women, the effect of education in delaying marriage is limited to the early twenties; for women in professional and technical occupations, by the late twenties these factors may actually increase the probability of marriage (Kato, 2004).

So when did women’s earning capacity shift from making marriage harder to making it easier? Fukuda (2013), using data from the “Panel Survey on Consumers,” shows that up through cohorts born in the 1960s, women’s earning capacity has a negative effect on marriage, but for cohorts born in the 1970s and later, this effect turns positive. Other studies using different panel data also show that among younger cohorts, women’s earning capacity has an increasingly positive influence on marriage choice (He, 2018).

In short, the period when women’s improved earning capacity tended to make marriage more difficult appears to be largely confined to older generations. Among younger cohorts, higher earning capacity may still delay marriage, but by the late twenties it may instead increase the likelihood of marriage.

Conclusion

So far, we have reviewed major arguments regarding the relationship between women’s social advancement and rising non-marriage. A wide range of analyses using different data has been conducted, and researchers hold diverse views. In this article, for the sake of clarity, I have presented and organized prior research in a somewhat selective manner. Many of the studies mentioned here are available online; readers who are interested are encouraged to look them up.

At the outset, I introduced the claim that “if we stop promoting women’s participation and increase the number of full-time housewives, the falling birthrate will be solved.” In this installment, however, we have examined women’s social advancement only from the perspective of non-marriage. I would like to emphasize, finally, that women’s participation and empowerment—its very definition included—is an important topic that should also be discussed on its own terms, not only in relation to non-marriage or low fertility.

Throughout this piece, I have discussed “women” as a broad category in terms of social advancement and earning capacity. Of course, women themselves are diverse. One way to capture this diversity is through the lens of social stratification. In the third installment, I would like to examine the relationship between stratification and non-marriage.

[Series] Why Aren’t Young People Getting Married Anymore?
(1) Causes of Declining Marriage Rates through the Lens of Family Sociology
(2) Women’s Empowerment and the Rise in Non-Marriage

References

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