EN-ICHI Opens Up the Future of Family and Community
South Korea Shaken by the “0.78 Shock”
South Korea’s birth rate has fallen to a new record low—again the lowest in the world. Despite massive spending over many years, government measures have shown little sign of turning the tide. The country now faces an urgent need for fundamental reforms that would make people actually want to have children.
- The Hyper–Low Fertility Phenomenon
- Young People Hesitant to Marry
- The Heavy Burden of Child-Rearing Costs
- New Measures to Address the Low Birthrate
The Hyper–Low Fertility Phenomenon
In February 2023, Statistics Korea announced that the total fertility rate (TFR)—the average number of children a woman will have over her lifetime, regardless of marital status—fell to 0.78 in 2022. From more than three in the 1970s, the TFR slipped below one in 2018 and has now dropped beneath 0.8, marking a steep and continuing decline.
Annual births, which numbered 500,000–600,000 a little over two decades ago, halved to roughly 250,000 last year. Coupled with rapid population aging, this trajectory implies a future in which one working-age adult may have to support two seniors.
In Gangwon Province in the northeast, nursery schools have been closing in quick succession, with nursing homes often taking their place.
This is hyper–low fertility by any measure, and Korean media warn of a “0.78 shock.” The most immediate concerns are slowing growth as the working-age population shrinks and worsening public pension finances. Other worries include shrinking domestic demand—raising export dependence and vulnerability to external shocks—and a decline in defense capability as conscript numbers fall.
According to US financial giant Goldman Sachs, South Korea's economy began to shrink around 1960, and it showed a harsh outlook that by 1975, about half a century later, it would be smaller than the Philippines and Malaysia.
Young People Hesitant to Marry
Why has ultra-low fertility persisted this long? Broadly, for two reasons: more young people are reluctant to marry at all, and among those who do, the vast majority plan from the outset to have only one child—two at most.
In response to the “0.78 shock,” the Ministry of Health and Welfare hastily convened a March roundtable with fifteen people in their twenties and thirties to hear their views. Asked why they were not marrying, unmarried participants cited difficulty building assets and obtaining loans and difficulty securing stable housing. They also mentioned resistance to Korea’s distinctive wedding culture—where both families shoulder sizable costs that are then “recouped” via cash gifts—and the pressure that marriage equals childbirth.
Although it did not come up at the roundtable, tight job prospects for people in their twenties are also said to be a reason many give up on marriage.
Another factor behind the rise in the never-married is the increase in women who do not marry over their lifetimes. A recent report from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs titled “Changing Patterns of Marriage and Childbearing and a Paradigm Shift in Low-Fertility Policy” notes that the never-married rate among women at age 50 rose from 3.8% in 2015 to 7.1% in 2020, and is expected to exceed 10% by 2025. A time when one in ten women is never married is just around the corner.
As for the second driver—having fewer children even after marriage—a recent public opinion poll of about 1,100 adults by a private firm found the top reason for hesitating to have children was the cost of child-rearing (66.3%), followed by anxiety about whether the child will “turn out well” (28.1%).
The Heavy Burden of Child-Rearing Costs
What many Koreans find most crushing is the exorbitant spending on private education that begins as early as kindergarten. According to Statistics Korea’s 2022 Survey of Private Education Expenditures for Elementary, Middle, and High School Students, per-student private education spending rose 11% from the previous year to 410,000 won (about ¥45,000). Excluding children who do not take private lessons, the figure reaches 520,000 won (about ¥57,000)—both the highest since the survey began in 2007.
Many experts view this cost burden as a root cause of low fertility. In a society steeped in Confucian values, with school systems that prize academic credentials, after-school tutoring aimed at admission to elite universities is pervasive, and its downsides are widely criticized.
To cover these expenses, some parents sell their homes or take out education loans, leaving household finances strained. Such families are even labeled “edu-poor”—poor because of education costs.
Over the past 15 years, the Korean government has poured roughly 280 trillion won (about ¥31 trillion) into anti-low-birthrate policies, yet the effort has fallen short. As the Seoul Shinmun argued in an editorial, this shows that simple cash-handout “scattershot” policies are ineffective; Korea must become a livable, attractive country where having and raising children is not prohibitively difficult.
New Measures to Address the Low Birthrate
On March 28, 2023, President Yoon Suk-yeol (then in office) chaired, for the first time since taking office, a meeting of the Presidential Committee on Low Birthrate and Aging Society. He stressed that “the low birthrate is a major national agenda item that the government and private sector must tackle together. Issues in welfare, education, employment, housing, and taxation—along with women’s economic participation and other cultural factors—are intricately intertwined.” He added, “Unless we end a culture of excessive, unnecessary competition, it will be difficult to find a fundamental solution to the low-birthrate problem.”
At the meeting, the Yoon administration outlined its policy direction and tasks for a low-birthrate/aging society, built around four strategic pillars and five core areas. With respect to the five core areas, the plan included: tripling childcare services; conducting surveys and strengthening systems to support work–childrearing balance; expanding reduced working-hours support to prevent women’s career interruptions; increasing the supply of public housing for newlyweds to address home-purchase difficulties; and relaxing public-housing eligibility based on the number of children.
As President Yoon noted, any fundamental solution will likely require changes in culture and public attitudes. The question is how far these government-led measures can go in delivering results.
(Originally published in "EN-ICHI FORUM", May 2023 issue)
